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Introduction: Fear and 
Loathing of Evolutionary 
Psychology in the Social 
Sciences 
Daniel W. Leger 
Alan C. Kamil 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Jeffrey A. French 
University of Nebraska-Omaha 
When one looks at the intellectual landscape of the modern university, 
at the scholarly and scientific interests of its faculty, the panorama 
is seamless. There are no discontinuities. The interests of physicists 
transmogrify into those of chemists, those of chemists into those of 
biologists, and so on. The lines, the divisions, between departments 
have been created out of administrative, not intellectual, necessity. 
For example, consider the divide between chemistry and biology. 
There is a set of chemical processes that are characteristic of living 
systems. Is the study of these processes chemistry or biology? This is 
a meaningless question. To be a really good biochemist, one must be 
both a biologist and a chemist. After all, biochemistry is the study of 
chemical processes as carried out by biological systems. 
Now consider the divide between biology and psychology. Psy-
chological processes are produced by organisms and are the result of 
biological systems. The nature of psychological processes, therefore, 
must be understood, at least in part, in terms of biology. But biol-
ogy is a huge, diverse discipline whose subject matter ranges from 
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molecules to ecosystems and from the present to the deep past. So to 
say that psychological processes need to be understood biologically 
is a tall order. However, psychology has long embraced parts of the 
biological panorama, namely neurophysiology and endocrinology. 
We have organized this symposium in recognition of our belief that 
many questions that have interested psychologists can benefit from 
contact with other areas of biology, particularly those that deal with 
populations over long spans of time: ecology and evolution. 
One only need read the newspaper to be aware of the tremendous 
advances that are taking place in contemporary biology. At the molec-
ular level, these advances are revealing the power of the information 
contained in the four-letter alphabet of DNA. Although we must not 
succumb to simple-minded genetic determinism (so common in the 
newspaper stories), it is clear that molecular biology will transform 
our understanding of many arenas of human existence, including 
psychology. 
The advances at the level of the whole organism are equally 
impressive. The power of the modern synthesis of Darwinian thought 
is proving itself again and again. Although sometimes surrounded 
by controversy, evolutionary ideas are leading to a revolution in how 
we understand the world and our own place in that world. Thus, 
evolutionary psychology, defined as the study of psychological topics 
in the light of Darwinian ideas, such as natural and sexual selection, 
is beginning to have an important influence on our understanding of 
psychological processes, an influence that will grow dramatically in 
the next 25 years. 
The primary reason that this growth will occur is that Darwin was 
right when he proposed fundamental continuity between humans 
and all other species that exist on earth. Evidence from every level— 
DNA, development, morphology, paleontology, behavior—is congru-
ent with this idea. Humans are part of, and must be understood as 
part of, the biological world. 
Nonetheless, the road to understanding human psychology as 
the product of natural selection is rough to say the least. Courtwright 
(1996), a historian, summarized this nicely: "The idea that human 
behavior is shaped by an underlying animal nature determined by 
millions of years of evolution is roughly as popular among con-
temporary historians as it is among Baptists" (p. 7). We would add 
that most psychologists would side with the historians and Bap-
XI 
Introduction 
tists. The antievolutionary sentiments of many social scientists stem 
from misunderstandings whose origins reach back to the centuries-
old nature/nurture debate. These misunderstandings have acted as 
barriers to full acceptance of Darwinian thinking in psychology. Our 
goal in this chapter is to briefly describe some of the most common 
misunderstandings of evolutionary psychology and to offer remedies 
to them. 
Five Misunderstandings of Evolutionary Psychology 
Although a large majority of psychologists believe in evolution in 
general and of the human species in particular, evolutionary psychol-
ogy has been slow to take root. Moreover, criticisms of evolutionary 
psychology are often shrill—reminiscent of the complaints of cre-
ationists when addressing evolution in general—which suggests that 
there is a "gut level" hostility toward evolutionary psychology that 
needs to be understood and tempered before progress can be made. 
We believe there are five main reasons why evolutionary psychology 
has encountered resistance. 
The naturalistic fallacy. Evolution is a natural process, but "natural" 
implies wholesome and good. According to this thinking, much about 
human behavior that we find objectionable (for example, rape or 
infanticide) would have to be condoned if we accept evolutionary 
hypotheses of human behavior. This is the kernel of the naturalistic 
fallacy. We wish to add our voices to the chorus that eschews the 
naturalistic fallacy. We agree with Buss (1995): "The metatheory of 
evolutionary psychology is descriptive, not prescriptive—it carries 
no values in its teeth" (p. 167). Evolution is neither moral nor immoral. 
It is purely pragmatic. That which has worked in the past persists 
to the present. But the values that we may attach to natural events 
are completely separate. Tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes are all 
natural, too, but we do what we can to guard against them and to 
minimize the suffering they may cause. Diseases are also natural 
and disruptive, so biomedical researchers are working feverishly to 
eliminate them. Evolutionary psychologists are sometimes accused 
of condoning rape or murder, or of, at least, providing an argument 
in the legal defenses of those who commit such crimes. We find it odd 
that those scientists who study socially disruptive behaviors from a 
traditional social science framework are never accused of "aiding and 
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abetting" but that evolutionary psychologists are. Injurious behaviors 
must be understood in order to combat them, and evolutionary 
analyses can contribute substantially to that understanding. 
The study of evolution does not provide grounds for unjust 
treatment of individuals. For example, evolutionary psychologists 
are often accused of sexism (Travis & Yeager, 1991). But the evolution 
of sex differences is widespread in the animal kingdom. The selection 
conditions that faced our male human ancestors differed from those 
that faced our female human ancestors. Consequently, a host of mor-
phological, physiological, and behavioral differences have evolved 
(Geary, 1998). Does this imply that girls and women should be limited 
to different paths than those that are made available to boys and men? 
No. Given less protection under the law? Certainly not. Treated as 
though they are members of a totally disjointed category? Prepos-
terous. The observation that males and females differ quantitatively 
on some traits, but do so with much overlap in their distributions, 
has been caricatured as meaning that all men differ from all women. 
This is absurd. Despite claims that evolutionary psychology is sexist 
or racist (Fairchild, 1991), the discipline merely seeks to understand, 
not to prop up, deplorable sexist and racist practices and ideologies. 
Evolved means inflexible. Many psychologists (and even biologists) 
have a mistaken idea of what an evolved behavior looks like. Their 
thinking goes something like this: Evolution means genetics and 
genetics means reflexive, instinctive behavior. We do not see much 
pure instinct in humans, so evolutionary psychology, although per-
haps of value for animal studies, is of little value for understanding 
humans. Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid, and Buss (1996) described this 
thinking and offered a correction to it: "Evolutionary hypotheses 
are sometimes misinterpreted as implying rigid, robotlike, instinc-
tual behavior that suggests that the individual is oblivious to the 
social environment. In fact, evolutionary psychology postulates psy-
chological mechanisms that were designed to respond to the social 
environment" (p. 363). 
The theme of the symposium, motivation, fits nicely into an evo-
lutionary approach to human behavior. What we posit is that natural 
selection has led to the evolution of motivational processes, ones that 
goad one to action. Actions themselves are often learned and their 
expression is situationally flexible. Evolutionary psychology seeks 
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to understand these motivational processes as they exist in Homo 
sapiens by examining the historical, selective conditions that drove 
their evolution into their present forms. Evolutionary psychology is 
less concerned with the particular behavioral patterns used in achiev-
ing motivated goal states than with the reasons for the motivational 
processes themselves. 
Evolutionary psychologists have embraced the notion of de-
velopmental plasticity and are linking plasticity with its environ-
mental "switches" and underlying genetic mechanisms. Phenotypic 
outcomes, including behavior, may vary markedly depending on 
environmental conditions. Developmental psychologists, of course, 
have been keenly interested in such processes; indeed, psychology 
as a whole has staked out the landscape of behavioral plasticity as 
its domain. But biologists have also long recognized developmental 
plasticity. For example, in many reptiles and other vertebrates an 
individual can develop either as a male or as a female, depending on 
such environmental conditions as temperature during early devel-
opment (Bull, 1985). Larval tiger salamanders can develop into one 
of two different morphs depending on population density. In high-
density conditions, most individuals become cannibalistic and are 
equipped with specialized carnivore-like mouth parts quite different 
from those of the low-density morph, which is specialized for eating 
small invertebrates (Pfennig & Collins, 1993). Many vertebrates adopt 
different mating systems (for example, monogamy versus polyandry) 
or parental care patterns (female only, male only, or biparental care) 
as a function of such environmental conditions as food abundance 
(reviewed by Lott, 1984). Psychologists who think that biology is con-
cerned just with rigid, instinctive, and otherwise inflexible processes 
are ignorant of the biology that has developed during the last 40 years. 
But surprisingly, there is substantial resistance among psychol-
ogists to certain hypothesized cases of developmental flexibility. For 
example, recent studies assert that puberty may be accelerated in 
girls exposed to unstable and stressful family environments (Belsky, 
Steinberg, & Draper, 1991) or to poor relationships with their fathers 
(Ellis, McFadyen-Ketchum, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999). This work 
has drawn considerable ire and disbelief despite its solid evidentiary 
base and its consistency with comparative findings in life history. 
Hypothesized relations between childhood familial environments— 
which are admittedly complex and difficult to quantify—and a va-
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riety of human life history strategies are emerging as important in 
evolutionary psychology, as well they should. Daly and Wilson's 
chapter in this volume, for example, presents evidence that young 
men living in economically disadvantaged conditions, especially if 
they live near more advantaged individuals, may be especially likely 
to take risks, even risks having life-and-death stakes. Their analysis 
hints at the operation of flexible developmental outcomes, and they 
would certainly agree that analyses of the developmental histories of 
the individuals involved would shed much light on the issue of male 
violence. 
Interestingly, another form of male-initiated violence—rape— 
may be sensitive to early family environment (Thornhill & Palmer, 
2000). So why do evolutionary accounts of human violence draw 
such vicious attacks? After all, violence is being viewed in contexts 
that mainstream psychologists have embraced for decades, namely, 
flexible, environmentally contingent responses. What is the prob-
lem? Probably the naturalistic fallacy. The critics of evolutionary 
approaches to violence—whether rape, homicides among men, child 
abuse or infanticide—seem to be more concerned with culpability 
than with understanding the phenomenon. Again, understanding a 
phenomenon is not equivalent to condoning it. 
Confusing proximate and ultimate causes. Another common mis-
understanding of evolutionary psychology is the mistake of confus-
ing ultimate causes of behavior with proximate causes. Those who 
make this error correctly deduce that evolutionary psychology differs 
from the rest of psychology by being selectionistic. Indeed, Daly and 
Wilson (1999 and this volume) define evolutionary psychology as 
the application of selectionist thinking to psychological phenomena. 
Unfortunately, some have mistakenly placed the naturally selected 
consequences of the behavior as it occurred in previous generations 
into the role of proximate motivator of the behaving individual. 
For example, sexual intercourse is seen as being motivated by the 
desire to have children. But because many people take steps to have 
sexual intercourse without having children, the critic claims that 
evolutionary psychology cannot be correct. But this is backwards. 
The reason why sexual motivation is manifest at all is because of 
the reproductive success garnered by ancestral individuals whose 
psychologies operated in such a way as to produce sexual motivation. 
Introduction 
The decision not to have children at all, which seems to be especially 
common among academics and other highly educated individuals 
(Vining, 1986), is similarly regarded as evidence against evolved 
psychology. But offspring production is not the proximate motive 
for sexual intercourse. Offspring are the consequence of engaging in 
sexual intercourse. The fact that recent technologies permit sexual 
intercourse without reproduction is no threat to evolutionary psy-
chology, because until very recently obtaining the proximate goal 
would have lead to the ultimate consequence. 
The nature of adaptation. Evolutionary psychology differs from the 
rest of psychology in its application of selectionist thinking. Most 
psychologists are comfortable with the environment in its ontogenetic 
role, that of influencing and shaping individual development, but 
they are not accustomed to identifying the selective role of the envi-
ronment, that is, the conditions and events that differentially affect 
reproductive success. Traffic accidents, diseases, judicially imposed 
incarceration, and marital choices are all selective processes to the 
extent that they nonrandomly influence reproductive success. As 
evolutionists, we are keen on identifying behavioral/psychological 
attributes that influence reproductive success. Some forms of these 
attributes reduce reproductive success and are therefore said to be 
maladaptive, while other forms increase reproductive success and 
are said to be adaptive. 
But adaptation is a complex concept that is frequently misun-
derstood. There are three main methods to the study of adaptation 
(Caro & Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987). First, we can measure morpho-
logical, physiological, or behavioral traits along with fitness (such as 
number of surviving offspring) in individuals in contemporaneous 
populations. This leads to insights into the current utility of the trait 
of interest. But this method tells us nothing of the trait's history. Sec-
ond, we can investigate the selective history of a trait by employing 
comparative methodologies (Harvey & Pagel, 1991). Third, we can 
analyze traits themselves to find evidence of "special design." The 
notion of special design depends on a "reverse engineering" analysis 
of a trait. That is, a trait's attributes are examined in order to generate 
hypotheses about what the trait does. For example, noting that pupils 
open and close in concert with changes in light intensity leads to hy-
potheses about visual responses to light. This is an obvious example, 
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but the ones that we find of interest in evolutionary psychology can 
yield to the same basic approach (Pinker, 1997). McClintock's chap-
ter describes women's endocrine responses to a molecule found in 
perspiration that can advance or delay the recipient's next menstrual 
cycle. Gangestad's chapter claims that women exhibit preferences 
for male facial symmetry and even prefer the odors of more sym-
metrical males, especially when women are most fertile. Applying 
reverse engineering to these processes can tell us how they may have 
contributed to reproductive success in previous generations. 
However, we must note that the reverse engineering approach 
does not test the assumption of adaptation. Furthermore, it is most 
useful where the natural history of the species under study is well 
known, which may never be the case for Homo sapiens. We suspect 
that the most important challenge facing evolutionary psychology is 
the development of methods to rigorously test hypotheses about the 
evolutionary history and adaptive significance of specific traits. 
Misconstruals of adaptation have been used by critics in an effort 
to undermine evolutionary interpretations of human behavior. First, 
adaptation has been misunderstood to mean that all individuals 
should be adapted, meaning that their behavior should contribute to 
survival and reproductive success. The failure to behave adaptively is 
seen as evidence against evolutionary views. Such reasoning is faulty. 
Individual maladaptation may result from several causes, including 
developmental errors. Brains are complex structures and they are 
subject to the vagaries of complex construction. No one claims that 
the heart is not adapted for pumping blood on the grounds that 
valves are sometimes misshapen and therefore maladaptive. So why 
should we conclude that psychological processes are not evolved and 
(generally) adaptive for their bearers even though some individuals 
may be psychologically maladapted? 
Second, current selective environments often differ from those 
that existed during most of the history of the trait. Adaptation re-
sults from previous generations of individuals interacting with their 
selective environments. But if the selective environment in those 
generations differed from those now, we might find that typical in-
dividuals alive today demonstrate maladaptations. For instance, our 
tastes for certain foods—sugar, salt, fat—may contribute to various 
health problems, but these tastes evolved in earlier times when such 
diets were not as readily obtained as they are now and when few 
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people led sedentary lives. Although there is no doubt that some 
individuals possess characteristics that make them less fit than others, 
the question of whether or not the environments in which most people 
live today are generally ill suited to typical phenotypes is debatable. 
With a global population rapidly approaching six billion, it looks 
as though our current environments are quite congenial to our traits. 
Certainly, there is mortality associated with overindulgence, but most 
of it occurs in postreproductive years and therefore is only weakly 
selected against. Certainly there are many unhappy people in the 
world, but there is no way of knowing whether they would have been 
happier in a forager lifestyle, and in either case, natural selection is 
not about happiness; it is about reproductive success. 
Another complaint that is directed at evolutionary psychology 
concerns the evolutionary history of the behavior of interest. Those 
who seem most hostile to evolutionary thinking (for example, Eagly & 
Wood, 1999) point to inconsistencies and disagreements among evo-
lutionary biologists regarding the nature of adaptation. First among 
these is the difference between traits whose original function was 
the same as its current function versus those traits whose function 
has changed. The former are termed adaptations and the latter are 
exaptations. Natural selection has given rise to both. An exaptation is 
merely an adaptation whose function has changed. 
Another distinction is between adaptation/exaptation and inci-
dental by-products of selection. Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, 
and Wakefield (1998) have written a wonderfully clear exposition of 
these concepts. A by-product is a phenotypic feature that itself is not 
associated with reproductive success but which is present because of 
some other feature which is. Buss et al. give the example of the human 
navel as a nonadaptive by-product of the adaptive umbilicus. The 
rumbling sounds of digestive systems doing their work is another 
example. In behavioral or psychological terms, remembering tele-
phone numbers may be a by-product of naturally selected, adaptive 
memory processes, and driving a car is a by-product of a host of 
adaptive perceptual and motor skills that evolved for very different 
applications. 
It is important to note that natural selection has operated in all 
of these cases, either producing the adaptive (or exaptive) feature 
or the feature that has spun off the by-product. The error made by 
antievolutionists is in thinking that if a phenotypic feature is not an 
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adaptation (in the strict sense of the term), then it is not evolved. This 
is critical for evolutionary psychology because what we hypothesize 
to have evolved are mental modules (cognitive, motivational, and 
emotional operations; see Gigerenzer, this volume), but not specific 
behavioral outputs. So, for example, young men might attempt to 
impress young women by showing off their material possessions or 
social status. The fact that they do so by driving up in a shiny new car 
or by bragging about their promotion at work is simply the expression 
of this evolved psychological process in its current cultural context. 
Analyses of evolved behavior operating in a very new environmental 
context is fundamentally no different from noting that heart rate 
increases while climbing a long flight of stairs (instead of chasing 
mobile prey) or that the vestibular system maintains balance while 
one is rounding a corner in a car (instead of turning around to evade a 
predator). In other words, we put to use all manner of traits in dealing 
with recently encountered environmental conditions. Psychological 
traits are no different from morphological or physiological traits in 
this regard. 
The study of evolutionary adaptation has also provided useful 
insights into the origins and etiology of significant psychological 
disorders. From the perspective of the traditional biomedical model, 
disorders such as depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, and substance 
abuse and addiction are viewed as pathologies, and certainly as 
maladaptive behaviors, at least from the perspective of the function-
ing of a single individual. However, the application of evolutionary 
analyses to these phenomena has yielded further insights into these 
psychological states. These insights include information regarding 
the proximate mechanisms underlying the pathological disorders, 
and the potential selective environments that lead to their expression, 
and those that may be promoting the maintenance and elaboration 
of these traits in current populations (McGuire, Marks, Nesse, & 
Troisi, 1992; Nesse & Berridge, 1997; Nesse 1999; Nesse, this volume). 
Further, these analyses also suggest the ways in which some states 
that are considered to be pathological according to the biomedical 
model may simply reflect by-products of selection for other traits 
(for example, Crow, 1995,1997). 
An interesting task confronting evolutionary psychologists is 
determining whether a trait is now a "spandrel," a feature that orig-
inated as a by-product but which is currently correlated with repro-
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ductive success (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Buss et al., 1998). Apossible 
example is reading and writing, both of which are recent in human 
history and undoubtedly arose as by-products of spoken language, 
visual acuity, and manual dexterity. Are reading and writing still by-
products or have they become spandrels? In other words, are reading 
and writing correlated with reproductive success? In modern, selec-
tive environments they probably are, but that discussion would lead 
us astray from our main point: Regardless of whether the phenotypic 
feature is or was adaptive, and if so, whether its function has changed, 
the phenotypic feature is still evolved. 
But there is one issue regarding adaptation that we still need 
to address, and it concerns the human mind and whether human 
mental processes are the by-products of selection, which have not 
yet been selected, or whether these processes have undergone direct 
selection. If they have been selected, then we expect to find evidence 
of "special design," the notion that selection results in efficiencies, 
functional specializations, speed, precision, and so on, that would 
not be expected if the trait were merely a by-product. These issues 
are addressed in the next section. 
The general-purpose mind. The final reason why some psycholo-
gists have not embraced evolutionary concepts is a pervasive misun-
derstanding of what evolution has wrought. Although most psychol-
ogists are not creationists, they are social scientists, and acceptance of 
what is often called the "traditional social science model" is pervasive 
indeed. The basic tenet of the model is that natural selection of 
humans has produced a sophisticated problem-solving device, the 
human brain/mind, whose abilities are capacious but which depend 
on individual experience for their expression. Further, this device can 
be brought to bear on myriad diverse problems, ranging from the 
intricacies of social dynamics (Seyfarth & Cheney, this volume), to 
mathematical problem solving, to strategizing in sports and games, 
and planning what to wear to work. What evolution has wrought, 
therefore, is so unconstrained in its use that it has curtailed further 
evolution! This device has permitted us to shape our environments 
to suit our needs, rather than us being selected by our environments. 
In brief, most social scientists seem to acknowledge human evolution 
while at the same time declaring it irrelevant. 
This widely held position regarding the place of evolution within 
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modern psychology deserves careful consideration. Its rebuttal is one 
of the major themes running through the chapters of this symposium. 
To what extent is human psychology dependent on a flexible general-
purpose cognitive device as opposed to a (large) number of more 
specific devices? Further, how would we know which view is more 
likely to be correct? 
One way of approaching the problem is neuropsychologically. If 
the human brain / mind is indeed a general-purpose device, we would 
expect losses of function to be diffuse when the device becomes dam-
aged, as through injury or stroke. In contrast, if there are numerous, 
highly specialized devices, one would expect losses to be much more 
restricted. Neuropsychological data clearly support the multiple-
devices view. Aphasias, for example, not only take the forms of the 
classic expressive (Broca's) and receptive (Wernicke's) forms but of 
even more singular losses of function, such as the inability to generate 
nouns while other parts of speech remain intact; or the inability to 
use common nouns even though proper nouns are used normally 
(Gazzaniga, 1989). We would not expect to find facial agnosia—the 
loss of ability to recognize familiar people by facial features alone—if 
facial recognition was but one of many processes controlled by the 
general-purpose device. 
Studies of nonclinical brain processes are also supporting the 
multiple-device view of brain organization. The recent finding that 
second languages learned after early childhood utilize brain tissue 
distant from that which is most active in the native language (Kim, 
Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997) is an interesting example of this approach. 
Noninvasive imaging techniques are becoming more commonly used 
by cognitive neuroscientists, and we expect that the trend toward 
more precise localization of function will continue. 
But evolutionary psychologists are behavioral scientists, and it is 
from studies of behavior that most of our insights (and controversies) 
are generated. What do we look for in patterns of behavior that would 
distinguish between the general-purpose and multiple-specialized-
devices views of human behavior? This question has parallels to 
those asked about learning processes beginning in the 1960s when 
"preparedness" began to be recognized. In short, if a single process 
is at work, we expect uniformity in the performance of the system. 
We would not expect to find some tasks that are inordinately easy (or 
difficult) to learn or remember. We would not expect to find marked 
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changes in performance when the content of a problem-solving task 
switches from ecologically neutral to ecologically relevant. 
The recognition and appreciation of numerous, domain-specific 
devices is a trend with a long history in psychology. Most of the 
early work along these lines concerned learning. Is learning a general 
process, or is it, as Shettleworth (1993), Kamil (1988), and others have 
argued, a box of tools, each of which is specialized for performing 
certain tasks? Closely related ideas have been voiced by Sherry and 
Schacter (1987), who have made a convincing case that multiple mem-
ory systems have evolved with properties that make each one quite 
adept at one task (for example, remembering song features in birds) 
or another (remembering the locations of food caches), but not both. 
Finally, cognitive psychologists have widely embraced the notion that 
intelligence is not a single capacity, but several (Sternberg, 1985). In 
sum, the specialized, modular organization of cognitive systems that 
is being advocated by evolutionary psychologists is consistent with a 
trend that has been underway in mainstream psychology for at least 
40 years. 
In conclusion, we have discussed five misunderstandings that 
have acted as obstacles to widespread acceptance of evolutionary, 
selectionist thinking in modern psychology. All five persist because 
some psychologists seem threatened by this "new" way of thinking. 
But there is nothing to fear. Studies of development and of proximate 
mechanisms—the historical core of psychological research—will not 
and should not go away. Rather, they will now be cast into a broader, 
richer framework, one whose history goes back much further than 
that of the behaving individual's life span. We will see, for example, 
why certain developmental processes are favored in some selective 
environmental contexts but not in others. We will see that environ-
mentally contingent phenotypic plasticity is not unique to our species 
and that such flexibility tends to occur in specific conditions. We will 
see that the foibles of human cognition make perfect sense when cog-
nitive processes are viewed as the products of the selection problems 
that faced ancestral humans. In short, evolutionary psychology takes 
nothing away from traditional psychology. Instead, it adds bridges to 
other disciplines that also wish to understand the human condition. 
Evolutionary psychology is here to stay. Its principles and find-
ings are appearing in many recent books dealing with such topics 
as parental behavior (Hrdy, 1999), sex differences in behavior (Low, 
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1999), the operations of multiple cognitive processes (Pinker, 1997), 
rape (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000), and many others. We believe the 
contributions to this symposium will take the field forward another 
step and hopefully introduce many to this emerging and exciting 
discipline. 
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